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ABSTRACT 
To help educate computer/network users and administrators on the complexities and 
potential implementation pitfalls of PKI, the work outlined in this thesis extended the 
CyberCIEGE computer security simulation game with additional PKI-related 
functionality. The research developed a scenario definition file for the CyberCIEGE 
game engine that supports a new game scenario that illustrates PKI concepts (e.g., cross-
certification, certificate path processing and certificate revocation), configuration choices, 
and the security implications thereof. The game engine was enhanced to realistically 
model the parameters of an actual X.509 digital certificate. Test cases designed for this 
game extension verified that the scenario reasonably portrayed realistic PKI deployment 
issues and provided feedback consistent with real-world PKI implementations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THESIS STATEMENT 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop educational information security scenarios 
that highlight the most prominent issues related to proper implementation of Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) solutions for incorporation into the CyberCIEGE game engine. 
CyberCIEGE, jointly created by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Information 
Systems Security Studies and Research and Rivermind, Inc. (Irvine & Thompson, 2010), 
is an interactive video game that is used to enhance computer security education through 
a series of scenarios that highlight Information Assurance concepts and training 
objectives. 
In pursuit of the above primary thesis objective, this research sought to answer the 
following subsidiary questions: 
1. What is the target student/player profile (i.e., level of difficulty/detail) of 
the CyberCIEGE game? 
2. What are the pertinent/prominent policy and operational variables 
surrounding the implementation of PKI in the real world? 
3. Can actual digital certificates (e.g., X.509) used in real-world PKI be 
integrated into CyberCIEGE? If not, what are the most apropos elements 
of an “actual certificate” that should be included in the game’s abstraction 
of a certificate? 
4. Of the identified pertinent (PKI) variables, which are the best candidates 
for inclusion into the CyberCIEGE game environment; as predicated by 
any limitations of the game, or educational bounds regarding the target 
student/player profile? 
5. What is an ideal “story board” (game scenario) that would best serve to 
focus a player’s attention on those identified best PKI variables? 
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B. RELATED WORK 
The CyberCIEGE game engine was recently expanded to include PKI features, 
including certification authorities, selection of installed roots and cross certification 
(Irvine & Thompson, 2010). The game engine modifications include modeling of chains 
of trust and potential risks with cross certification schemes. The enhancements proposed 
in this thesis, which are focused on a typical corporate environment, augments the current 
PKI features of the game in order to further illustrate PKI security and interoperability 
issues involved with e-mail communications. 
C. THESIS SCOPE AND LAYOUT 
This thesis research encompasses three main areas: 
1. Study of Current State of PKI Implementations in the Real World 
The first phase of the study entailed research on the current state of PKI 
implementations and applications in the real world. Pertinent variables that determine 
different types of PKI configurations are identified, then these variables are analyzed 
against organizational goals (e.g., business cost and benefits) to determine the optimum 
PKI configuration. 
2. Development of a Scenario to Represent the Identified PKI 
Application 
A CyberCIEGE scenario was developed to allow players to understand the 
different security implications of varied PKI configurations based on an identified PKI 
application from the initial study. The existing CyberCIEGE game engine PKI features 
were analyzed and game engine extensions were proposed to support the scenario. 
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3. Enhancement of CyberCIEGE User Interface to Represent Actual 
X.509 Certificates 
Prior to this thesis, CyberCIEGE’s representation of a PKI certificate was limited 
to brief descriptions of the certificate’s subject and its issuing Certification Authority. 
This thesis enhanced certificate representation by adding additional, select, X.509 
certificate attributes. The additional attributes were chosen in order to give players a 
better understanding of how the different parameters in a certificate affect the security of 
PKI operations. 
This thesis is presented in the following chapters: 
• Chapter I–Introduction. This chapter defines the thesis statement and 
scope. It lists some of the previous work related to this thesis and also 
provides an overview how the report is being structured. 
• Chapter II–Background. This chapter describes the CyberCIEGE project 
and how it can be used as an effective educational tool to relate PKI 
operational considerations. It further presents the key concepts of PKI and 
provides an overview of PKI in practice, before identifying the specific 
PKI elements that will be modeled in the CyberCIEGE scenario. 
• Chapter III–Scenario Strategy. This chapter discusses the educational 
goals which the scenario aims to achieve and establishes the framework 
for the scenario development. 
• Chapter IV–Scenario Description. This chapter describes the simulated 
gaming environment that is being modeled by the scenario definition. It 
includes the player briefings, objectives, assets to be protected and e-mail 
policies that are depicted in the scenario. 
• Chapter V–Scenario Testing. This chapter covers the test objectives and 
strategies to verify the correctness of the certificate attack scenario. It 
includes the scope, expected results and actual results of the test case. 
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• Chapter VI–Conclusion. This chapter summarizes the research and work 
done for this thesis and proposes additional areas for future research. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. COMPUTER SECURITY AWARENESS AND TRAINING 
With the advancement of Information Technology, computers have become an 
all-essential asset for many organizations, hosting various applications ranging from 
mission-critical weapon systems to peacetime administrative portals. We have seen a 
shift in management’s emphasis from merely deploying functional IT implementations, 
to increased awareness of and attention to computer security threats and defenses. 
Despite this increased awareness from management, user behavior has not changed 
significantly. Users will often opt for the easiest and most convenient means of achieving 
their work goals. User security typically extends only to what security administrators 
have configured into their computers, or perhaps specific security policy mandates that 
are drilled into daily operations. Without understanding the rationale behind the security 
measures that are in place, users are more likely to take the paths of least (security) 
resistance. Education and training in computer security is often mundane and boring for 
both users and administrators (Irvine & Thompson, 2003). 
Computer security is constantly evolving and requires security practitioners to be 
up-to-date and well-informed. The traditional textbook style of security education and 
training can no longer suffice to edify users on complex security policies and 
technologies. The challenge remains to find an IT security education tool that is both 
effective, adaptive, and more interesting than plain text descriptions of complex security 
technologies and interdependencies.  
B. CYBERCIEGE AS AN EDUCATIONAL TOOL 
CyberCIEGE, an interactive simulation game that is used to enhance information 
assurance education and training through constructive resource management techniques, 
is a natural choice for computer security educational tool. 
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In the CyberCIEGE interactive environment, players are guided through a series 
of scenarios that highlight various cyber security education and training objectives. In 
each scenario, players assume the role of the IT manager who must keep the IT 
infrastructure running in support of various enterprise goals, while making tradeoffs and 
prioritization decisions as they are challenged to maintain a balance between budget, 
productivity and security. The consequences of these choices are reflected in the success 
of either the enterprise or of external adversaries, which will determine if the player 
achieves his game objectives (Irvine & Thompson, 2010; Allen, Irvine, & Thompson, 
2005). 
The game also contains encyclopedia entries and edifying movies that explain and 
illustrate how certain security mechanisms work. The rich features in CyberCIEGE 
provide an ideal platform for developing new coursework for training and education in 
information assurance, including demonstrating the concepts of identification, 
authentication, provenance, and access control in inter-/intra-corporate communications. 
The simulation environment allows players to understand the bigger picture implications 
of IT/security decisions that have to be made in the real world; a perspective which 
would otherwise be challenging to experience in the real world given limited resources 
and the real fear of making errors affecting operational systems. 
This thesis will look into providing the game with a new scenario, and potentially 
extending the game engine, to more realistically model the actual parameters of PKI 
configuration and to enhance player understanding of PKI choices, trade-offs, and 
concepts. This will complement traditional seminar-style education to provide a 
comprehensive learning experience to the players. The scenario will also provide a 
taxonomy of real-world PKI implementations for future analysis and reference.  
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C. KEY CONCEPTS OF PKI 
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the basis of a pervasive1 security 
infrastructure whose services are implemented and delivered using public-key concepts 
and technique (Adams & Lloyd, 2003). It consists of a set of hardware, software, people, 
policies and procedures needed to create, manage, distribute, use, store and revoke digital 
certificates (“Public Key Infrastructure,” 2011). The following section explores the 
fundamental PKI concepts as well as public-key certificates and certificate revocation 
schemes in greater detail. 
1. Primary PKI Elements 
A fully functional PKI is composed of a large set of components and services. 
a. Certification Authority (CA) 
A Certification Authority is a trusted entity whose primary role is to sign 
and publish a certificate binding a public key pair to a user identity. The CA is a critical 
component in large-scale PKIs, but may not be present in small-scale PKIs as they might 
rely on external CAs to establish the trust hierarchy, which will be discussed in Section 3. 
b. Registration Authority (RA) 
Although the registration function can be implemented within the CA 
component, it is often delegated to a separate component called the Registration 
Authority. The RA is a trusted entity that is responsible for identification and 
authentication of certificate subjects, but does not issue certificates or CRLs (Federal PKI 
Policy Authority, 2007). Activities overseen by the RA may include establishing and 
confirming the identity of an individual, enrollment and registration, credential issuance 
and credential revocation. 
                                                 
1 An infrastructure may be considered a pervasive substrate, which is a foundation or underpinning for 
large environment such as a corporate organization. 
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The RA may also delegate functional roles and duties to a Local 
Registration Authority (LRA), which is essentially a smaller-scale RA, to enhance 
scalability and decrease operational costs. 
c. Certificate Repository 
A certificate repository is a collection of all the root certificates located in 
an end user’s workstation, which is used to establish the roots of webs of trust. 
d. Certificate Revocation 
Every certificate has an expiry date, but in the event that the certificate has 
been compromised (e.g., the laptop that contains the private key associated with a 
certificate has been stolen) before its expiration date, proper certificate management 
requires that there be some means of revoking the certificate so that any relying party will 
know that it is no longer valid and should not trust any transaction dependent upon it.  
e. Key Backup and Recovery, Key Update and Key History 
Real-world PKI users may lose their private keys (e.g., lose the smart card 
storing the PKI keys) within the certificate lifetime. Key backup (escrow) and recovery 
mechanisms allow such keys to be restored to prevent inaccessibility of data protected by 
the lost keys. Key updates, on the other hand, generate new keys to replace the existing 
ones, typically when a certificate expires, is revoked, or when there is a need to change 
the key lengths with respect to the encryption algorithms. 
Key histories must be managed to keep track of the users’ old keys and 
current keys in order to use the correct decryption key to decrypt the required data. 
f. Client Software 
PKI is essentially a client-server architecture whose server entities provide 
a collection of services to the end users (certificate owners and certificate users), such as 
the following (Adams & Lloyd, 2003): 
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• The CA provides certification services. 
• The RAs implement end-entity registration functions. 
• The repository holds certificates and revocation information. 
• The backup and recovery server manages private keys. 
Client software, on the other hand, implements the required client end of 
the PKI services on the end-user’s local platform, such as the following: 
• requests certification services; 
• initializes registration process; 
• asks for certificates and process relevant revocation information; 
and 
• understands key histories and requests for key updates/recovery 
when necessary. 
2. Certificate Structure 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) introduced the Internet X.509 PKI 
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile (Housley, Polk, Ford, & Solo, 
2002), which describes the generic structure of the X.509 certificate. Figure 1 shows the 
current Version 3 X.509 certificate structure, where some of the fields are further defined 
below: 
 
Figure 1.   Version 3 X.509 certificate structure (From Adams & Lloyd, 2003) 
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• Signature contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used by the 
CA to sign the certificate. 
• Issuer identifies the entity which has signed and issued the certificate. It 
must always be present. 
• Validity indicates the period during which the certificate is considered 
valid, unless it has been revoked. 
Extensions defined for X.509 v3 certificates are optional methods that help to 
associate additional attributes with users or public keys and for managing a certification 
hierarchy. An extension may be marked critical, which means that it must be recognized 
and processed “successfully” (its semantics satisfy the contingent security requirement 
that the extension addresses), otherwise the certificate will be rejected. A non-critical 
extension may be ignored if it is not recognized. 
The standard and private extensions that are available in X.509 v3 certificates are: 
Authority Key Identifier, Subject Key Identifier, Key Usage, Extended Key Usage, CRL 
Distribution Point, Private Key Usage, Certificate Policies, Policy Mappings, Subject 
Alternative Name, Issuer Alternative Name, Subject Directory Attributes, Basic 
Constrains, Name Constraints, Policy Constraints, Inhibit Any Policy and Freshest CRL 
Pointer. 
Some of the key extensions that have been deemed relevant to embellish the 
CyberCIEGE scenario in order to meet the learning objectives which we hope to impart 
as part of this research are elaborated below: 
• Key Usage is a bit string used to identify the function (e.g., digital 
signature, data encipherment, certificate signing) of the public key 
contained in the certificate. 
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• Extended Key Usage is a sequence of OIDs2 that indicates one or more 
applications for which the certified public key may be used, in addition to 
the functions specified under Key Usage field. Some of these applications 
include: Transport Layer Security (TLS) web server/client authentication, 
code signing, e-mail protection, time stamping and Online Certificate 
Status Protocol (OCSP) signing (Housley et al., 2002). (OCSP will be 
further discussed in section 4.) 
• CRL Distribution Point states the location where the PKI client software 
can refer to for the revocation information associated with the certificate 
in question. 
• Certificate Policies contains a sequence of OIDs and optional qualifiers 
that indicate requirements and restrictions associated with the intended use 
of the end-entity certificates issued by a given CA under a specific policy. 
These policy requirements and restrictions will—among other things—
establish acceptable policy regarding certification path validation. For 
example; policy may limit path length from the end-entity certificate to the 
issuing/root certificate (Housley et al., 2002). 
3. Trust Models 
In the context of PKI, the notion of trust is often associated with public keys. In 
particular, an end entity trusts a Certification Authority (CA) when the end entity 
assumes that the CA will establish and protect the veracity of the binding between the 
identity of a subject and the public key associated with the subject (Fulp, 2011).  
a. Strict Hierarchy of CAs 
The trusted CA would form the root of the certification hierarchy, or “trust 
anchor,” for the entire domain of PKI entities in that hierarchy, as shown in Figure 2. 
                                                 
2 OID stands for ObjectIdentifier, which is a unique representation for a given object (Adams & Lloyd, 
2003). 
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Figure 2.   Strict hierarchy of CAs 
The root CA will issue and publish a self-signed certificate, which will be 
used as a basis of trust for all the entities in the hierarchy. The root CA will also sign and 
issue certificates to the intermediate CAs at the next level; the intermediate CAs will in 
turn sign and issue certificates to the certificate owners at the lower level.  
b. Distributed Trust Architecture and Cross-Certification 
A distributed trust architecture is formed by interconnecting independent 
strict hierarchies of CAs, as illustrated in Figure 3. This model is more reflective of the 
real world, where each disparate organization implements her own PKI and these PKIs do 
not necessarily emanate from a common root CA, yet need to establish secure 
communications with one another nonetheless. 
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Figure 3.   Distributed trust architecture model 
Cross-certification is the process wherein one CA attests to the 
authenticity of another CA’s public key. This is cryptographically affected via the 
attesting CA “signing” (encrypting with its private key) the hash of the other CA’s 
credential information with that other CA’s public key. When this process is reciprocated 
there is a bi-directional expression of trust between the two separate PKI hierarchies. This 
cross-certification enables trust to be extended between users from the two related CAs. 
In Figure 3, CA1 is aware that CA2 is authorized to issue certificates in CA2’s domain and 
hence will be able to validate entities in CA2’s domain, hence establishing 
interoperability. 
c. Certificate Path Processing 
Certificate path processing is the process of establishing a chain of trust all 
the way up to the root of the hierarchy, or the trust anchor, such that the certificate can be 
validated against a recognized root CA in the certificate repository. The target certificate 
is trusted only if every certificate in the path is examined to be trustworthy. In order to 
“walk the chain,” the relying party’s client software would have to download and validate 
the certificate of every entity in the path for which it did not already have locally 
available. Alternatively, the target could send some or all certificates in its ancestral chain 
to the relying party along with the signed message (Fulp, 2011). 
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4. Certificate Revocation 
As discussed earlier, part of the validation process performed by the PKI client 
software includes checking the revocation status of the target certificate. The software 
would have to either retrieve the revocation information directly from a CRL distribution 
point, or to query the revocation information from a trusted third party via the Online 
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). 
CRLs are basically data structures that contain a list of revoked certificates, 
signed and maintained by the same CA that issued those certificates. The list has to be 
updated and published regularly so that compromised certificates would be rightfully 
ignored. The generic structure of the CRL is represented in Figure 4 (Adams & Lloyd, 
2003). 
 
Figure 4.   CRL structure (From Adams & Lloyd, 2003) 
OCSP is a simple request-response protocol that allows a relying party to query 
the revocation status of a given certificate from a trusted entity known as an OCSP 
responder. It requires the relying party and the responder to be online. The response will 
include the certificate status, certificate validity, and time and reason of revocation if the 
certificate has been revoked. In general, OCSP can provide more real-time and up-to-date 
revocation information as compared to an offline CRL distribution point.  
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5. Protection of Private Keys 
One of the main purposes of the certificate is to prove possession of private key 
without revealing information about it. It is thus necessary to protect the private key from 
compromise or loss (22nd Open Grid Forum, 2008). If the private key is lost, not only 
must a new certificate be created and redistributed, trust and procedures may have to be 
reestablished as well. In the case of a compromise, the attacker can now use the private 
key maliciously. Even a full-fledged PKI can no longer guarantee the integrity of the 
subscriber and support non-repudiation. 
Private key management is a non-trivial task. Some important considerations to 
ensure a secure key life-cycle management include the location of the key-pair 
generation, the need to generate multiple key-pairs per end entity to support distinct 
applications, and the secure storage of private keys (e.g., in smart cards). The distribution 
of private keys often has to be augmented with administrative procedures and dedicated 
distribution channels to ensure that the private key could not possibly have been accessed 
by anyone other than its rightful owner and any authorized escrow (backup) authority. 
6. Assurance 
The success of PKI is based upon the trust that an end entity places on a 
Certification Authority. This translates to having confidence in the robustness of the 
processes and procedures that a CA has in place for end-entity registration as well as the 
security controls it has in place to protect its own signing private key. The problem is that 
certificates from a trusted CA may be accepted unconditionally, yet their integrity cannot 
be easily verified. A breach in the CA will result in fraudulent certificates being issued 
and PKI relying parties basing their trust on these fraudulent certificates. Further, failure 
to verify that a CA issuer is itself a recognized/respected/trusted CA sets up the PKI user 
community for “bogus” certificates being used to secure various electronic transactions  
(Hofman, 2011; Bright, 2011). 
 
 
 
16 
Time-stamping is another critical element in the support for non-repudiation. 
There must be an authoritative time source for the entire domain of PKI entities, in order 
to validate that the document contents were not tampered with subsequent to the 
application of the digital signature.  
D. PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE (PKI) IN PRACTICE 
The ubiquity of computing has led to more applications and services being 
developed and deployed online to reach out to the mass consumer market. Some of these 
applications involve sensitive financial data and personal identifiable information, which 
has called for the need for strongly authenticated and trusted transactions. As commercial 
organizations become more conscious of their cyber security needs, they increasingly 
recognize the value of PKI technology to attain their identity management and data 
security goals. We also see continued PKI growth within the Federal government, spurred 
by Federal agencies needing strongly authenticated, trusted transactions: a) within the 
Federal agency; b) between itself and other Federal agencies; and c) with external entities 
(e.g., business partners, state and local governments, constituents) (ICAMSC, 2010). 
Currently, we see the integration of PKI into the following applications: 
• E-mail clients (encryption and/or authentication of e-mails) 
• Root stores of major internet browser and operating systems 
• Word processors and readers (encryption and/or authentication of 
documents) 
• Web and thick client applications (user authentication via Smart Cards) 
• Secure communication protocols (bootstrapping of public key methods in 
the initial protocol setup) 
• Code signing 
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1. PKI Implementation Considerations 
PKI technology is mature, as evidenced by the emergence of identity management 
and security standards that increasingly utilize PKI (ICAMSC, 2010). Nevertheless, we 
must be aware of the issues and decisions involved in the deployment and operation of a 
PKI. 
a. Trust Models: Hierarchical versus Distributed 
The Federal PKI follows a distributed trust model, where the Federal 
Bridge CA (FBCA) maintains bilateral cross-certification with multiple federal agencies 
and commercial service providers, such as the Department of Defense (DoD), United 
States Postal Service (USPS), VeriSign, etc. (ICAMSC, 2010). This model is more 
flexible compared to the hierarchical model as it allows CAs to be dispensed with 
minimal disruption to the other interconnected CA domains. In the event that the Federal 
Bridge CA goes down (e.g., compromise of the CA’s signing private key), other Bridge 
CAs that were cross-certified with it may still validate the entities that were certified by 
the FBCA. 
b. In-Sourcing versus Out-Sourcing 
Some of the common factors that affect the decision of whether to in-
source or out-source PKI services include economic considerations and the source of 
trust. For example, a military organization may choose to maintain total control over their 
PKI, as they do not wish to depend on a third-party service provider to manage the keys 
that are used to protect their classified data. On the other hand, a smaller commercial 
enterprise may opt for out-sourcing (e.g., pay VeriSign to issue a certificate bound to the 
company) due to economic and resource constraints. 
c. Certificate Policies 
Certificate policies have to be properly defined as they list the 
requirements and restrictions associated with the intended use of the certificates issued 
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under the policy. Specifically, formal agreements need to be established between 
enterprise domains that want to communicate under one or more inter-domain policies 
(Adams & Lloyd, 2003), to facilitate interoperability. This means that the public key 
certificates have to be populated with the Certificate Policies extension to support this 
requirement and the client software has to be capable of interpreting these business 
controls during certificate path processing. 
d. Online versus Offline Operations 
As discussed earlier, using OCSP requires end-users to be online in order 
to perform the certificate revocation checks. However, this may not be suitable for certain 
operations, e.g., when user has to validate a certificate in an offline operation. In this 
case, CRLs and the necessary certificate chains may be cached to enable offline 
certificate validation. It is also important to note that the security of offline operations is 
often reduced as the CRLs are not up-do-date and time-stamping service is no longer 
available. 
e. Hardware Requirements 
Pure-bred software PKI implementations may be susceptible to Trojan 
horses and network attacks and hence should be complemented with hardware 
component, such as the Smart Card, to store private keys and other sensitive information. 
The middleware that sits between the hardware device (e.g., the Smart Card reader) and 
the PKI client software must also be capable of extracting the relevant information from 
the Smart Card when required. For example, during a TLS web client authentication, 
when the user is prompted to login using his Smart Card, the middleware should only 
show certificates with Key Usage extension of type digitalSignature and obscure those of 
type dataEncipherment. When multiple certificates are available, we observe that the 
decision still lies with the user to determine the correct certificate to be used. This is a 
typical example showing the tradeoff between interoperability and security. 
 
 
19 
2. End-User Behavior 
Consider an e-mail scenario in which PKI is integrated into the e-mail client using 
Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME). When Alice receives a signed 
e-mail from Bob, her S/MIME application would examine the certificate that comes with 
the e-mail. Alice’s S/MIME application would first verify if Bob’s certificate resides in 
the trusted end-entity certificate store. If not, it will try to locate the CA certificate that 
was used to sign Bob’s certificate in its set of root certificates or the trusted CA 
certificate store (ones that have been imported by Alice previously). If the CA certificate 
does not exist, the S/MIME application would then perform certificate path processing to 
construct the entire certificate chain that leads up to Bob’s root CA and validate the 
correctness of the signature, check validity period, check for revocation, and check other 
critical fields in the certificate (e.g., key usage). 
If the entire certificate chain cannot be obtained, or any of the certificates fail to 
validate, the S/MIME software would pop up a dialog box that says “The digital 
signature cannot be verified. Do you want to proceed?” Alice, and the majority of the 
users, would simply click OK without understanding the implication of that decision. 
Bob’s certificate is now added to the trusted end-entity certificate store and the next time 
Bob’s message arrives, it would naturally be verifiable. 
Now, suppose Bob has three different keys; one for data encryption, one for 
digital signing and one for identification; and he chooses to sign an e-mail to Alice using 
his identity key. Alice’s e-mail client should flag the e-mail as suspicious and pop up a 
dialog box to warn Bob. Interestingly, we observed that different e-mail clients handle 
anomalies in certificates differently, as illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. Microsoft Outlook 
2007 did not detect the anomaly and stated that the digital signature is valid and trusted, 
while Mozilla Thunderbird gives a warning noting that the sender’s certificate did not 
include an e-mail address, since Bob’s e-mail address would only be associated with his 
digital signature key, but not his identity key. 
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Figure 5.   S/Mime response on Microsoft Outlook 
 
Figure 6.   S/Mime response on Mozilla Thunderbird 
With respect to handling of different S/MIME responses, user training and 
awareness will always be helpful to ensure users understand the ramifications of their 
decisions and potential risks therein. If users are trained to recognize the consequence of 
their decisions, the security afforded by PKI services can be improved. This will be one 
of the factors that influence the selection of components to be modeled into CyberCIEGE 
to allow players to go through the scenario and understand the different security 
implications of their actions. 
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E. SELECTION OF PKI ELEMENTS TO BE MODELED INTO 
CYBERCIEGE 
1. Selection Criteria 
As presented in the previous section, there are many variables that define different 
types of PKI configurations. We have discussed some of the business drivers and modes 
of operations that influence the choice of these variables and the corresponding technical 
requirements that have to be in place to support the identified PKI configuration. 
The next question is to consider which of these variables should be modeled into 
CyberCIEGE to fully enhance the learning experience of the players. Based on the 
existing PKI implementations in the real world and the various implementation 
considerations, we have drawn up the key learning objectives which the players will 
benefit from in this PKI study, which will eventually translate to the exact elements 
modeled into CyberCIEGE. 
• Understand the real-world deployment issues and decisions, especially 
relevant when players are posted back to their organization to work in the 
cyber security field. 
• Note the subtleties in some of the PKI configurations and how attackers 
could make use of these to overcome the security controls, even for a full-
fledged large scale PKI. 
• Recognize the implication of unwitting security decisions (e.g., clicking 
OK without even reading or understanding the warning text that may 
cause an “untrusted” certificate to be permanently placed in a “trusted” 
store). 
• Relate to the course material of CS3690 Network Security, on the topic of 
Authentication. 
Table 1 summarizes the list of PKI elements to be modeled into CyberCIEGE for 
this study, as well as an explanation regarding why and how they are being modeled. 
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Table 1.   List of PKI elements to be modeled into CyberCIEGE 
PKI Element Why and How is it being modeled? 
Cross-
certification 
With the increase in the use of a distributed trust model, it would be 
useful to illustrate how secure communications between different PKI 
hierarchies is enabled through the use of cross-certification. 
Players will be able to observe how different organizations with 
different CAs are able to exchange e-mails through the cross-
certification mechanism. 
Certificate path 
processing 
One of the key benefits of PKI includes strong authentication, which 
translates to trusting the validation of the entire certificate chain. 
Players will be able to observe the certificate chain constructed by the 
e-mail client and personally validate the correctness of the individual 
fields of the certificate. 
Certificate 
revocation 
Part of the validation process described above includes checking the 
revocation status of the target certificate. 
Players will be able to observe how malicious attackers send spoofed e-
mails through a compromised laptop containing the user certificate and 
how CRL implementation can overcome this vulnerability. 
X.509 
certificate 
structure 
Certificates are the basis of PKI transactions. It is noteworthy to delve 
into some of the fields of the certificate structure in order to better 
visualize and comprehend the processes involved in validation, e.g., in 
certificate path processing and certificate revocation.  
Certificate 
extensions 
Certain extensions in the X.509 certificate are critical and must be 
processed and understood as part of the validation process. These 
include Key Usage, Extended Key Usage and CRL Distribution Point, 
which will be modeled as part of the X.509 certificate structure. 
In order to avoid confronting players with the administrative minutia of 
actual OIDs used to indicate the applications for which the certificate 
may be used, it was considered more useful to model these as textual 
descriptions in the Certificate Purpose tab (further described in Chapter 
III). 
Certificate 
policies 
Certificate policies need to be defined in order to promote 
interoperability between different organizations. In order to enhance the 
learning experience of players, it would be more meaningful to model 
these as scenario briefings (further described in Chapter III) instead of 
actual OIDs in the Certificate Policies field of the X.509 certificate 
structure. 
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2. Assumptions 
The configuration to be modeled into CyberCIEGE will be an appropriate level of 
abstraction of PKI implementation that is reflective of real-world deployment, in this way 
players will not be overwhelmed with unnecessary details that do not contribute to the 
learning objectives. 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is assumed that the PKI setup in CyberCIEGE 
will operate as per normal, without implementing the details on the life-cycle 
management of keys, CRL semantics and other fields of the X.509 certificate.  
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter has described an overview of the key concepts of PKI and the 
elements to be modeled into CyberCIEGE for this study. The next chapter will present 
the educational goals and the development strategy of the CyberCIEGE scenario 
developed as part of this thesis. 
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III. SCENARIO STRATEGY 
A. SCENARIO OVERVIEW  
As discussed in the previous chapter, end-user awareness and training is essential 
to realize the true value of any security infrastructure that is put in place by the 
organization. The next phase of this thesis is thus to develop a CyberCIEGE scenario to 
portray real-world PKI implementation configurations and teach players the importance 
of adopting the right configuration to protect the organization’s assets. CyberCIEGE PKI 
abstractions would be described in terms of player configuration choices and the security 
implications of these choices on PKI implementation configuration and vulnerabilities.  
The intended audience for this CyberCIEGE scenario is IT employees from both 
the government and corporate sectors. The Federal Public Key Infrastructure (FPKI) has 
evolved to meet increasing Federal identity management demands, with the emergence of 
government-wide electronic authentication and identity management guidelines, 
mandates and standards to promote interoperability of businesses (ICAMSC, 2010). 
CyberCIEGE complements these efforts by providing a platform to enhance player 
understanding of PKI choices, trade-offs, and concepts through role-playing the scenario. 
As organizations embrace the power of the Internet, e-mail is emerging as an 
increasingly important communication tool, as it offers a cost-effective way for 
employees to send business communications to business partners and contractors  
(Blackbaud, Inc., 2006). Hence, e-mail communications will be an ideal application to 
illustrate PKI interoperability issues in the scenario developed for this thesis. 
The scenario is structured in phases, such that players learn more advanced PKI 
concepts as they proceed further into the game. Issues concerning certificate revocation 
and certificate path processing will be presented to the players as they complete each 
phase sequentially. Changes to the organizational e-mail policy will be introduced 
incrementally with each phase and players are expected to make the appropriate 
configuration changes in order to fulfill the objectives to complete that phase. The 
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scenario will be contrived such that players are forced to make certain decisions rather 
than use brute force and “turn everything on” by default (Irvine & Thompson, 2010). 
Players may fail to complete the scenario in the initial attempts, but the scenario is 
designed to help players learn from the mistakes that they have committed previously. 
Coupled with the guidance provided through encyclopedia entries and educational 
videos, players will then be able to understand the various PKI concepts introduced and 
eventually win the game. 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCENARIO 
This section will describe the main storyboard of the scenario and how elements 
of CyberCIEGE are used to create a game scenario that models realistic PKI deployment 
issues and a security decision-making process to achieve the educational objectives 
prescribed for this scenario. The modifications made to the game engine will also be 
presented along with the development of the scenario. 
The first (and recurring) lesson the player must learn is that security policy must 
be understood: what resources are being protected, and from whom are they being 
protected? Once the player understands the value (sensitivity) of the resources 
(information), the player makes choices that affect the protection of the information in 
accordance with the security policy (Irvine & Thompson, 2003) 
In the scenario developed for this thesis, the organizational e-mail policy will be 
reinforced progressively as the player proceeds through each of the phases and realizes 
the need for a stronger e-mail policy. It will encompass the key PKI concepts identified in 
Chapter II, as described in the latter part of this section: use of self-signed certificates, 
cross-certification, certificate revocation, certificate path processing and X.509 certificate 
extensions. Players will learn these concepts and appreciate how the PKI settings can be 
configured securely to ensure strongly authenticated and trusted transactions between a 
company and her business partners. 
A corporate products company, named Singa Electronic International (Singa), 
will be used as the backdrop for the scenario. The main mode of operations for this 
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company is e-mail exchange of purchase orders and related business data with her official 
business partner—a manufacturing firm named Pura Microchip Technology (Pura)—and 
its subcontractor named Friendly Chips (Friendly). In the scenario, hostile game 
characters will be introduced in the form of an employee from a rival company named 
Rival Electronics (Rival). Assumed to have abundant resources, Rival’s main aim is to 
tarnish the reputation of Singa by employing technical exploits against ill-configured PKI 
settings to compromise e-mail assets. 
In CyberCIEGE, assets are information resources that may be critical to the 
organization’s success. Assets have value to the organization based on their secrecy or 
integrity, and assets also have an associated motive value, which determines the means an 
attacker might employ to compromise the asset. In this scenario, the main assets are the 
e-mails that contain the details of purchase orders and important business data. Rival 
Electronics is motivated to fool Singa and her partners with fraudulent e-mail and thus 
the player’s main aim is to protect the integrity of the e-mail. 
Typically, CyberCIEGE scenarios require the player to play the role of a decision 
maker for a single enterprise. In this scenario, the player will make choices for two 
enterprises, Singa and Pura.  As part of the scenario briefing and descriptions, the player 
will be informed of the management policies that were derived based on business 
relationships between the two enterprises.  In particular, Singa will accept business 
transactions that are electronically signed by Pura, and Pura will accept signed 
transactions from Singa.  Both Singa and Pura have agreed to honor commitments signed 
using their respective private keys. 
To focus the game on the PKI learning objectives, the scenario has some default 
settings: 
• All organizations, together with their respective employees (i.e., users3), 
physical hardware and software components, will be assigned dedicated 
                                                 
3 “Users” refers to the virtual characters within the game while “players” refer to people who interact 
with the game simulation. 
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networks, Discretionary Access Control (DAC) groups and zones with 
appropriate physical security measures. 
• Users will be assigned individual workstations, which have been hardened 
against typical network attacks. 
• All users have gone through the clearance procedures, so players do not 
have to conduct initial background checks for individual users. 
1. Use of Self-Signed Certificates 
At the beginning of the scenario, the organizational e-mail policy mandates that 
all e-mails exchanged between Singa and Pura will have to be digitally signed with 
public key certificates to ensure the integrity of the transaction. Hence, the e-mail client 
software on the users’ workstation will be configured with the initial settings that 
nominally meet this policy.  The configurations will instruct the virtual users to sign e-
mail with self-signed certificates, and it will instruct virtual users to require e-mail 
signatures on received e-mail for all e-mail exchanges between Singa and Pura. 
The problem with using self-signed certificates is that this does not offer any 
guarantee that the identity bound to the particular self-signed certificate is indeed its true 
owner. In fact, Rival’s employee could create the following self-signed certificate (as 
shown in Figure 7) and try to spoof Singa’s employee’s identity by sending an e-mail to 
Pura’s employee, requesting for bulk purchase and signing off the e-mail with the self-
signed certificate. 
 
Version … Issuer … Subject Public Key 
V3 … <Singa’s 
employee> 
… <Singa’s 
employee> 
RSA (2048 bits) 
Figure 7.   Sample self-signed certificate structure 
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Furthermore, the self-signed certificates do not meet the intent of the management 
policy because they lack a clear tie to the corresponding enterprise.  For example, when 
Pura receives a signed order, it needs assurance that the subject who signed the order is 
indeed an entity that is an authorized representation of Singa. 
The player would avoid this threat by configuring the e-mail clients of both 
Singa’s and Pura’s employees to “Authenticate certificate.” When this option is enabled, 
the e-mail client will validate the certificate’s CA (i.e., the Issuer) against the repository 
of installed root certificates on the local workstation. In this case, the use of self-signed 
certificates will fail as none of the Issuers’ certificates would be installed as a root on any 
of the user workstations. 
The player learns about the false assurance of using self-signed certificates and 
that they would fail to authenticate the validity of the entity that is making the 
representation about the subject of the certificate. Additionally, an encyclopedia entry 
will be created to explain why self-signed certificates are still used, which form the basis 
of web of trust in PGP and root certificates in X.509. 
In the previous version of CyberCIEGE, the game engine did not distinguish 
between self-signed certificates and CA-signed certificates. The game engine has been 
extended to recognize self-signed certificates and is now able to simulate the distinction 
between authenticating e-mails (purely based on the presence of any certificate) and 
authenticating certificates (validating the Issuer against the list of installed root 
certificates). 
2. Cross-Certification 
In order to achieve the goal of ensuring that the integrity of the e-mails is not 
compromised, the player would have to purchase a Certification Authority for both Singa 
and Pura and install the root certificate of the newly bought Certification Authority in the 
respective e-mail clients. The player would then select Singa’s CA as the Certification 
Authority for Singa’s employees and Pura’s CA as the Certification Authority for Pura’s 
employees.  
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The final step would be the bilateral cross-certification between Singa’s CA and 
Pura’s CA to enable the trust to be extended between users from Singa and Pura. By 
allowing the users to achieve the stipulated e-mail goals, the player learns about the 
cross-certification process and how it enables interoperability of two distinct PKI 
domains. 
The player may choose to install Singa’s CA as a root certificate on Pura’s 
workstations and, correspondingly, Pura’s CA as a root certificate on Singa’s 
workstation. This is still a valid representation that reflects the business policy governing 
the interoperability of the two domains. However, the management may want the cross-
certificates (i.e., the certificate bearing one CA’s credentials that is signed by the other 
CA) to expire in six months, while roots certificates may persist for a longer time. 
The player may also opt to subscribe to the services of a public CA, named 
Veriscream CA, by paying it to issue certificates bound to Singa and Pura, respectively. 
This means that Veriscream CA is now making representation about the identity of the 
subject of the certificate. In the event that Veriscream CA is compromised, Singa and 
Pura could not be held liable for the commitments signed using certificates issued by 
Veriscream CA. In the game, the player will encounter the case when the adversary 
compromises Versicream CA to issue bogus certificates that thwart the integrity of the e-
mail exchange. The player would then have to revert to the prescribed solution and 
understand the tradeoffs between using a public CA (more cost-effective, especially for 
small organizations) and deploying a dedicated CA for the organization (much more 
resources required, but more secure).  
3. Certificate Revocation 
Once the player has achieved the first objective in the game, the issue of 
certificate revocation will be presented to the player. In the real world, there is always the 
careless employee who would fail to adopt safe key management practices. To support 
this scenario, the game engine has been modified to simulate exposure of a user’s private 
PKI key and the mitigation of this through the use of a Certificate Revocation List (CRL).  
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The scenario uses this new feature in the following manner: A careless employee from 
Singa recycled his workstation without clearing his private keys. The adversary was able 
to get hold of the recycled workstation, gain access to the private key and was able to 
spoof the identity of the careless employee and e-mail purchase orders on his behalf. 
The player would have to purchase a server that stores the Certificate Revocation 
List (CRL), which would then trigger the IT support staff in the game to revoke the 
certificate and issue a new one to the careless employee. The CRL Distribution Point 
extension in the X.509 certificate interface will also be updated to reflect the newly 
purchased server. The player would also have to configure the e-mail clients of the users 
involved in this part of the scenario to “Check for certificate revocation.” When this 
option is checked, the e-mail client would validate the certificate against the CRL server 
to ensure that it has not been revoked. The player would thus have to ensure that all the e-
mail clients (i.e., the relying parties) would have to be able to connect to the CRL server 
to check the revocation status of a certificate. This would then prevent the attacker from 
continuing to use the exposed private key of the careless employee. 
Through this scenario, the player learns about the importance of certificate 
revocation and the consequence of not implementing it as part of the PKI when he/she 
sees the actualization of an attack where the adversary uses the private key maliciously. 
4. Certificate Path Processing 
After the completion of Phase 1 of the scenario, the organizational e-mail policy 
would have been reinforced to include additional requirements (which correspond to the 
PKI concepts presented in the previous phase of the scenario): 
• The use of self-signed certificates shall be prohibited. 
• All certificates shall be authenticated against the repository of installed 
root certificates. 
• All certificates shall be checked against the CRL repository. 
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Phase 2 of the scenario is designed with the intent to help the player understand 
how certificate path processing is related to certificate policies—which reflects actual 
business relationships—especially when two or more organizations are involved. In this 
phase, the player is required to accomplish a new objective, which is to ensure that 
Singa’s employees are able to authenticate e-mail orders from Friendly, the subcontractor 
of Pura. This is a realistic representation of the operational considerations that 
organizations in the real world face, when they have to ensure the interoperability of their 
PKI with other PKIs to meet certain business requirements. 
According to the settings that the player has configured thus far from the 
beginning of the scenario, Singa’s employees are not able to validate any of Friendly’s 
employees’ certificates, because Friendly’s CA has not been installed as a root certificate 
in Singa’s workstations, nor has it been cross-certified with Singa’s CA or Pura’s CA. 
The initial scenario briefing will present instructions to lead the player to configure 
Pura’s CA to cross-certify4 Friendly’s CA certificate, since Friendly is Pura’s 
subcontractor and the two organizations would have established formal agreements on 
certificate usage policies. 
If this is done correctly, the users in the game would be able to achieve their e-
mail goals and the player would then be able to proceed to the next phase of the scenario. 
The player would also be presented with a multiple-choice question at the end of the 
scenario to test if they have understood how the certificate chain was constructed and 
validated, hence enabling e-mail exchange between Singa and Friendly. 
In addition, the player could click on “Validate Certificate” to view the validation 
results or visually verify and trace the certificate chain through the enhanced X.509 
certificate interface (as shown in Figure 8) and understand how the certificate of  
 
 
                                                 
4 This is an example of a unilateral cross-certification, where Pura’s CA signs Friendly’s CA 
certificate, but not vice versa. Unilateral cross-certification suffices to meet the objective prescribed for this 
phase of the scenario. 
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Friendly’s employee was validated. In making the necessary configuration change and 
answering the question correctly, the concept of certificate path processing would be 
reinforced. 
 
Figure 8.   X.509 certificate interface showing certification path 
There are a few ways the player could make configuration changes in order to let 
the users achieve the e-mail goals. For example, the player could choose to configure 
Singa’s CA to cross-certify Friendly’s CA certificate, or just install Friendly’s CA 
certificate as a root certificate in Singa’s workstations. This however, does not conform 
to the policy that was being described via the scenario briefings. As discussed in Chapter 
II Section C2, certificate policy terms dictate specific requirements for certification paths 
that include the CA certificate. In this case, it is important that the player understands that 
Pura’s signing of Friendly’s certificate indicates the representation that Pura has 
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established customer agreements and terms of use with Friendly as her subcontractor. 
Singa is relying on this representation made by Pura and Singa has business recourse in 
the event of a misrepresentation. If the player made any of the alternate configurations, 
Singa would not have recourse against Pura in the event that Friendly’s CA certificate is 
subverted. 
Nevertheless, the player will not be penalized and forced to revert to the 
prescribed solution, but instead his/her understanding will be challenged till he/she 
obtains the correct answer for the multiple choice question. Additionally, an encyclopedia 
entry will be created to present the different possible options of enabling interoperability 
between organizations and their respective tradeoffs. 
5. Key Usage 
The final phase of this scenario challenges the player with a new requirement to 
allow Singa’s employees to place purchase orders via Rival’s webpage to secure a rare 
microchip that only Rival produces, while protecting the integrity of the transactions with 
their other partners. 
The player would be required to set up a Transport Layer Security (TLS) web 
client authentication to allow Singa’s employees to access Rival’s webpage to place the 
required purchase orders. The TLS authentication procedure will specifically involve the 
server sending a random challenge string for the client to sign with his private key; the 
server will then be able to validate the response using the client’s public key in order to 
authenticate the client. When the player first configures the TLS web client settings on 
Singa’s workstations, the game engine has been programmed to entice him/her to reuse 
the existing e-mail certificate when Singa’s CA is chosen to be the Certification 
Authority. Next, the TLS challenge response will be specially crafted (e.g., “Singa would 
like to place 1,000,000 orders of Microchip M with Pura.”) to cause Singa’s employee to 
“sign” it unknowingly during the authentication procedure. 
The game engine has been modified to understand the notion of the digital signing 
key and identity key and will simulate the following attack by Rival. Rival’s employee 
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spoofs Singa’s employee’s identity by specially crafting a separate e-mail with the same 
body content “Singa would like to place 1,000,000 orders of Microchip M with Pura.” 
appends the authentic signature obtained from the above authentication procedure and 
sends it to Pura. With a valid certificate issued by Singa’s CA to Singa’s employee that 
has not been revoked, Singa is not able to repudiate this e-mail and hence must honor the 
bogus order.  
The vulnerability that the adversary tries to exploit in this scenario is the failure to 
distinguish between the key used for digital signing and the one used for identification. 
To counter this threat, the player would have to generate a separate certificate and key 
pair specifically for identification purpose. The TLS web client settings would also have 
to be configured to use the newly-generated identity certificate for authentication. In this 
way, Rival would not be able to extort Singa with the signed malicious response, since it 
has been signed with an identity key and not a signing key. 
Additionally, the player could visually verify the purpose of the different types of 
certificates available in the scenario through the enhanced X.509 certificate interface (as 
shown in Figure 9) and note the subtle difference between a certificate used for digital 
signing and one used for identification. 
  
 
 
Figure 9.   X.509 certificate interface showing certificate purpose 
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Through this scenario, the player would be able to note the subtleties involved 
when PKI is used in TLS client authentication and learn how attackers make use of these 
to overcome security controls. 
Once the player has met all the objectives prescribed in each phase of the 
scenario, he/she would then be able to complete and win the scenario. At the end of the 
game, the player would have picked up the key concepts of PKI, understood some real-
world deployment issues and recognized the implication of certain security decisions 
he/she made as a security administrator. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the design of a CyberCIEGE scenario that models 
realistic PKI deployment issues and security decision-making processes that help to 
achieve the learning objectives prescribed for this PKI study. The next chapter will 
provide more detail on how the various elements available in CyberCIEGE were used to 
implement the actual scenario. 
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IV. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
As part of this thesis research, a CyberCIEGE scenario named Cert Attack was 
developed to model realistic PKI deployment issues and a security decision-making 
process to achieve the educational objectives set out in Chapter II Section B. This chapter 
will describe the details of implementing the scenario in accordance with the strategies 
that have been outlined in Chapter III. 
A. SCENARIO BRIEFING 
The purpose of the briefing is to provide the player with a summary of the 
information security policy, which in this case is centered on maintaining the integrity of 
e-mail assets.  The briefing is intended to inform the player that the e-mail content is 
relied upon by both organizations and thus the management has established strong 
security policies to ensure that all e-mails are digitally signed by people who are 
authorized representatives of Singa and Pura. The policy description within the briefing 
is further augmented by descriptions of the scenario assets and descriptions of objectives. 
The following is the in-depth description of the scenario setting, which provides a 
description of the scenario context, the goals and requirements for the player and the 
instructions to play the game: 
Welcome to Singa Electronic International. To enable Singa to produce 
the finest electronics in the region, Singa’s management has established 
business agreements to order microchips exclusively with her official 
partner, Pura Microchip Technology. As part of the security policy, Singa 
and Pura have consented to using PKI to ensure the integrity of the 
transactions between the two organizations. In particular, Singa will 
accept business transactions that are electronically signed by Pura, and 
Pura will accept signed transactions from Singa.  Both Singa and Pura 
have agreed to honor commitments signed using their respective private 
keys. 
You have been appointed the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) 
and will be responsible for providing the necessary infrastructure to Singa 
and Pura to protect the integrity of the e-mail assets, such that they will 
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not be subject to attacks by Rival Electronics, Singa’s greatest competitor. 
As the CISO, you will need to understand the goals of the users, make 
decisions about the types of physical components to be purchased and how 
to configure these components. You will also need to take note of the 
individual policies Singa and Pura have while making these configuration 
choices. If your choice of implementation compromises the security of the 
e-mail assets in Singa/Pura, you will suffer monetary penalties. If you are 
able to fulfill all the objectives without encountering security attacks, you 
will proceed to the next phase of the game. You win the game once you 
have successfully completed all the objectives. 
This scenario is divided into three phases. You must complete all 
objectives of a phase before proceeding to the next phase. Use the 
“OBJECTIVES” tab to review your objectives for each phase. Press “F1” 
at any time to launch the encyclopedia. Press “k” to view keyboard 
shortcuts and navigation keys. Once you are ready, click the “OFFICE” 
tab and click the green button to play the game. Good luck! 
B. ZONE LAYOUT AND INITIAL NETWORK CONFIGURATION 
The scenario consists of the main zone, which is the office of Singa Electronic 
Limited, three offsite offices, namely Pura Microchip Technology, Friendly Chips and 
Rival Electronics, and a web zone where the public Certification Authority Veriscream 
CA resides. The layout of the scenario is shown in Figure 10. 
The player has been assigned the role of a CISO and will be responsible for 
configuring and maintaining the infrastructure in Singa Electronic Limited and Pura 
Microchip Technology. The player will not be able to configure the components residing 
in other zones. 
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Figure 10.   Layout of Cert Attack scenario 
C. USERS AND USER GOALS 
Users are the virtual characters within CyberCIEGE. If computers are available 
and purchased by the player, users will create and access the assets using the computers. 
User behavior is driven by the user goals specified by the scenario designer (CISR, 
2011). If user goals are not met, the users will express frustration and their productivities 
will be affected, which adversely affects the success of the organization. User goals can 
thus be used as a means to determine if the player has deployed the right infrastructure 
and configured the necessary settings, and will be used to decide if the player has 
achieved the game objectives. 
In the Cert Attack scenario, there are five users: Shirley and Sam from Singa 
Electronic Limited, Pete from Pura Microchip Technology, Dave from Friendly Chips 
and Roy from Rival Electronics. 
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Shirley is the primary liaison officer in Singa Electronic Limited. She is in charge 
of issuing purchase orders on behalf of Singa to Pete of Pura Microchip Technology. She 
also reads the technical specifications and any related business data sent by Pete and 
Dave of Friendly Chips. She is also tasked to place purchase orders from Rival 
Electronics’ web page to procure a rare chip. Shirley must be able to send e-mails to Pete, 
receive e-mails from Pete and Dave and access Rival’s webpage in order to fulfill her 
user goals. 
Sam is the secondary liaison officer in Singa Electronic Limited. He is responsible 
for issuing purchase orders on behalf of Singa to Pete, when Shirley is away from office. 
He needs to be able to send e-mail to Pete to complete his job. In this scenario, Sam is 
notorious for his sloppiness with regard to safe security practices. 
Pete is the main liaison officer in Pura Microchip Technology. He is in charge of 
accepting and processing purchase orders on behalf of Pura from Shirley/Sam. Pete must 
be able to send e-mails to Shirley, and receive e-mails from Shirley and Sam in order to 
accomplish his goal. 
Dave is an employee of Friendly Chips, the official subcontractor of Pura. He is 
responsible for sending technical specifications on behalf of Pura to Shirley for her 
review. Dave needs to be able to send e-mails to Shirley to fulfill his job requirement. 
Roy is a highly skilled hacker employed by Rival Electronics. Equipped with 
abundant resources and knowledge, his main aim is to tarnish the reputation of Singa. 
Although Roy has not been assigned any explicit user goals, he will constantly attempt to 
employ technical exploits against ill-configured PKI settings of Singa and Pura in order 
to compromise e-mail assets. 
D. PHYSICAL COMPONENTS 
The scenario is first loaded with the physical components as shown in Figure 10. 
The users are seated in their respective zones and are assigned individual workstations, 
which have been hardened against typical network attacks. Each workstation can be  
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configured with distinct application settings; in particular, e-mail and browser SSL 
settings (see Figures 11 and 12, respectively), which the player has to update in order to 
complete the objectives of the game. 
 
Figure 11.   E-mail Client Security Configuration interface 
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Figure 12.   SSL Client Configuration interface 
Every zone has a router that connects all the workstations and servers of that 
particular organization to the Internet. E-mail servers are deployed in Singa’s, Pura’s and 
Friendly’s zone to enable Sam, Shirley, Pete and Dave to exchange e-mails to fulfill their 
user goals. A web server is deployed in Rival’s zone to host Rival’s webpage, which 
Shirley will need to access as part of her job requirement. Two Certification Authorities 
are set up in Friendly’s zone and the web zone, respectively. Friendly CA is configured to 
be the Certification Authority for Dave. Veriscream CA is a public CA that resides in the 
web zone and issues pay-per-use certificates. It is the CA for Rival’s web server. 
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All the physical components in Friendly’s, Rival’s and the web zone are static 
components, i.e., the player will not be able to configure these components. 
The player will have to purchase some additional PKI components and deploy 
them onto the respective networks in order to achieve the objectives of the scenario. The 
catalog of components that are available for the players to purchase is as follows: 
• CRL Server. This is a high-cost specialized server that stores the 
certificate revocation. Once deployed, the IT support staff will revoke the 
certificate that has been compromised. It will also be reflected as the CRL 
Distribution Point in the X.509 certificate interface (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13.   X.509 certificate interface showing CRL Distribution Point 
• Certification Authority. This is a specialized server that contains 
certification authority software (not unlike much of the real world). Some 
scenarios include public “pay-per-cert” CAs that issue certificates. Players 
also have the option to purchase their own CAs to issue certificates for 
PKI-enabled components and applications. 
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E. NETWORKS 
Each zone will be assigned its individual network, which will connect all physical 
components in that zone, except for Friendly, CA, which will remain standalone, to 
reduce its exposure to Internet attacks that aim to subvert Certification Authorities. All 
the zones are connected to the Internet by default, so as to allow intercommunications 
between the different companies. 
F. ASSETS 
In CyberCIEGE, assets are resources. Players succeed by facilitating user access 
to assets. Assets are tagged with a motive, which determines the means by which the 
attacker will attempt to compromise an asset. Player choices affect the opportunity for the 
attacker to compromise the assets. The enterprise (and by extension the player) is 
penalized the value of an asset should it be compromised or made unavailable (CiSR, 
2011).  
E-mails are the most important assets in Cert Attack, since all business 
transactions occur via e-mail communications. As discussed in Chapter III, both Singa 
and Pura will honor the commitment to purchase orders sent via e-mail and hence the e-
mail assets are very valuable to both organizations. These are characterized by the 
following assets in the scenario: E-mail from Shirley to Pete, E-mail from Pete to Shirley 
and E-mail from Sam to Pete. These assets have to be authenticated against the sender of 
the e-mail, such that the recipient will have recourse against the sender. The later part of 
the scenario will require Dave to send technical specifications for a particular microchip 
to Shirley on behalf of Pete. This e-mail from Dave to Shirley will also have to be 
validated to uphold the trust in the e-mail communications that Singa and Pura have 
achieved and maintained thus far. 
In Cert Attack, the attacks are driven by the motives that relate to the integrity of 
the e-mail assets. This means that successful modification or impersonation of this asset 
(by the attacker) will result in monetary penalties. All e-mail assets have motive values of 
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50 to attract potential attackers like Roy. E-mail assets are stored in the e-mail servers 
residing in Singa’s, Pura’s and Friendly’s zones, respectively. 
G. PHASES AND OBJECTIVES 
This scenario is divided into three phases, with each phase introducing to the 
players some key concepts of PKI. There is a set of objectives tied to each phase of the 
scenario and the player is expected to fulfill the objectives by demonstrating knowledge 
of the PKI concepts being challenged. 
Phase 1 introduces the notion of self-signed certificates, cross-certification and 
certificate revocation. The player has to configure the e-mail client settings of the 
workstations of Singa and Pura and purchase the appropriate PKI components to ensure 
that Roy is not able to fool Shirley, Sam and Pete with fraudulent e-mails. 
Phase 2 introduces the concept of certificate path processing. The player is 
required to accomplish a new objective—to ensure that Shirley is able to receive business 
data from Dave. The key to completing this phase is to ensure that the player understands 
why the users in the game can achieve their e-mail goal by answering the questions 
posted at the end of this phase correctly. 
Phase 3, the final phase, extends the secure communications requirement from 
only e-mail, to include webpage (Rival’s) access. In this case, Rival’s webpage is simply 
a contrivance to confront the player with a security decision on the choice of keys, i.e., it 
is an asset that has not been assigned any motive value to entice Roy to compromise the 
actual webpage access. Roy is, however, motivated to entice Shirley to sign a malicious 
challenge string which he can use it to craft a bogus e-mail to spoof the asset “E-mail 
from Shirley to Pete”. Hence to win the game, the player needs to comprehend the subtle 
difference between a digital signing key and an identity key and make the right 
configuration to ensure that Shirley can place orders securely on Rival’s webpage without 
Roy being able to compromise any of the e-mail assets. 
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H. QUESTIONS 
In CyberCIEGE, question triggers can be used to test a player’s understanding of 
material and to potentially alter the direction of a scenario (CISR, 2011). The response to 
an incorrect player answer can be uniquely defined and the player will be required to 
answer the question again until he/she selects the correct reply. 
In Phase 2 of the Cert Attack scenario, the player’s understanding will be 
challenged via a multiple choice question (displayed in Figure 14) to check if he/she has 
understood the concept of certificate path processing, even though he/she may have 
configured the game settings incorrectly. 
 
Question: What do you think is the correct way to permit Shirley to authenticate e-mails from 
Dave, based on Singa’s company policy? 
Answer Feedback to Player 
a. Configure Shirley’s 
workstation to accept self-
signed certificates and 
direct Dave to use self-
signed certificates. 
Incorrect. 
The use of self-signed certificates was disallowed after the 
first attack by Roy. 
Please try answering the question again. 
b. Install Friendly CA’s 
(Dave’s CA) certificate as a 
trusted root in Shirley’s 
workstation. 
Incorrect. 
Installing Friendly CA’s certificate as a trusted root 
certificate in Shirley’s workstation will enable Shirley to 
authenticate e-mails from Dave, but this is against Singa’s 
company policy, as stated in the scenario briefing. In this 
case, Singa would have no recourse against Pura in the event 
that Friendly’s CA certificate is subverted. 
Please try answering the question again. 
c. Sign Friendly CA’s (Dave’s 
CA) certificate with Singa’s 
CA, which is already a 
trusted root installed in 
Shirley’s workstation. 
Incorrect. 
Signing Friendly CA’s certificate using Singa’s CA will 
enable Shirley to authenticate e-mails from Dave, but this is 
against Singa’s company policy, as stated in the scenario 
briefing. In this case, Singa would have no recourse against 
Pura in the event that Friendly’s CA certificate is subverted. 
Please try answering the question again. 
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Question: What do you think is the correct way to permit Shirley to authenticate e-mails from 
Dave, based on Singa’s company policy? 
Answer Feedback to Player 
d. Sign Friendly’s CA (Dave’s 
CA) certificate with Pura’s 
CA, whose CA has been 
cross-certified with Singa’s 
CA, which is a trusted root 
installed in Shirley’s 
workstation. 
Correct. 
As stated in the scenario briefing, Pura’s signing of Friendly 
CA’s certificate indicates the representation that Pura has 
established customer agreements and terms of use with 
Friendly as her subcontractor. Singa can then rely on this 
representation made by Pura and have business/legal 
recourse in the event of a misrepresentation. 
Figure 14.   CyberCIEGE question form for Cert Attack 
I. CONDITIONS AND TRIGGERS 
The CyberCIEGE scenario definition language allows scenario designers to 
periodically assess the ongoing game state “conditions” and respond using active 
“triggers” (CISR, 2011). Conditions can be used to assess whether players have achieved 
the game objectives or to provide the player with feedback before the engine does harm 
to the player’s network. Upon the occurrence of these conditions, the CyberCIEGE game 
engine will execute the corresponding triggers, which include popup messages, 
encyclopedia help entries, changes in user goals, commencement of attacks and user 
feedback to the player via balloon speech. 
The following section highlights some of the conditions and triggers that have 
been defined to measure the player progress and to provide appropriate feedback to the 
player for the Cert Attack scenario: 
Shirley has authenticated Pete’s certificate. This condition checks if the player has 
completed the first objective for Phase 1. In order to satisfy this condition, Shirley and 
Pete must have uninterrupted access to the respective assets without successful attacks by 
Roy for a specified period of time. This means that the player has to purchase additional 
CAs for Singa and Pura, as well as configure the e-mail settings of Shirley and Pete to 
allow them to exchange e-mail securely without Roy being able to carry out spoofed e-
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mail attacks in the specified time frame. When this condition is satisfied, a popup 
message will also be triggered to inform the player of his/her next objective. 
Sam’s certificate got compromised. In the second part of Phase 1, the scenario 
directs the game engine to simulate the case when Sam’s workstation is discarded 
without clearing the private keys, which subsequently fall into Roy’s hands. A 
KeyExposed trigger is used to simulate the exposure of Sam’s private key. Attack triggers 
are defined to go off at a predefined interval (further discussed in “E-mail Attacks or 
Internet Attacks”), and the next spoofed e-mail attack will succeed unless the player has 
taken steps to effectively revoke Sam’s certificate., A successful attack then triggers Roy 
to describe how the attack on the asset “E-mail from Sam to Pete” took place. Sam’s old 
certificate has been revoked. This condition verifies if the player has completed the 
second objective for Phase 1. To satisfy this condition, the player has to deploy a CRL 
server and direct Pete to check CRLs when authenticating e-mail from Sam to mitigate 
the attack caused by the KeyExposed trigger. If this condition is met, the player would 
have completed all the objectives in Phase 1 and the scenario will proceed to the next 
phase. 
Shirley installs Pura’s CA as root and/or Pete installs Singa’s CA as root. This 
condition checks if the player has misinterpreted the organizational policy described in 
the scenario briefing and installs Singa’s CA/Pura’s CA as a trusted root in Pete/Shirley’s 
workstation, respectively. If this condition is true, it means that the player has not fully 
understood the notion of cross-certification and will be required to revert to the 
prescribed solution in order to meet the objective of Phase 1. 
Shirley installs Friendly’s CA as root or Singa’s CA signs Friendly CA’s 
certificate. This condition checks if the player has misinterpreted the organization policy 
described in the scenario briefing and installs Friendly CA as a trusted root in Shirley’s 
workstation or has misconfigured Singa’s CA to sign Friendly CA’s certificate. If either 
of these conditions occurs, a different question dialog will be triggered to differentiate the 
feedback to the player when he/she answers incorrectly (as a result of his/her 
misconfiguration). 
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Shirley has received Dave’s e-mail.  This condition verifies if the player has 
completed the objective for Phase 2, i.e., to allow Shirley to receive and authenticate e-
mails from Dave. The player will have to demonstrate that he/she has understood how the 
business policy influenced the way the certificate path should be processed, by answering 
the question correctly. This is the goal and objective for Phase 2 of Cert Attack. If this 
condition is satisfied, the game will proceed to the final phase. 
Install Singa’s CA as root on Rival’s web server. In the final phase, Shirley will 
need to access Rival’s web page via a TLS web session. This trigger will instruct the 
game engine to install the CA’s root certificate that the player has purchased for Singa as 
a trusted root on Rival’s web server in order to allow TLS web session. Otherwise, 
Rival’s web server will not be able to validate Shirley’s identity and hence fail the user 
goal. 
Shirley is able to access Rival’s web page. This condition checks if the player has 
fulfilled the objective for Phase 3. To satisfy this condition, the player has to allow 
Shirley to access Rival’s web page via a TLS web client session, without exposing any 
vulnerability that Roy can exploit. If this condition is true, the player would have 
completed all the objectives of the scenario and win the game. 
E-mail Attacks or Internet Attacks. The game engine determines the success of 
attacks based on attacker motive, network topology, configuration settings and procedural 
settings (CISR, 2011). The “E-mail Attacks” and “Internet Attacks” triggers are defined 
such that the game engine derives attacker motive from the individual asset motives 
(discussed in Section F), and will cause the game engine to launch spoofed e-mail attacks 
or Internet attacks with a frequency of 0.04 days. If any of the e-mail assets has not been 
protected, the attack will succeed and the AssetAttacked condition will evaluate to true. 
The objectives described above are marked as complete by triggers that evaluate 
AssetAttacked conditions as well as conditions that assess user goal failures. The 
evaluation period of these triggers is 0.05 days. If attacks did not occur and users have 
had uninterrupted access to assets for 0.05 days, it implies the player has implemented the 
necessary countermeasures to prevent the attacks from happening. 
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When any of the attack happens, speak triggers will be invoked and Roy will 
describe the details of his attack on the game screen. 
J. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided details on how the Cert Attack scenario was designed and 
implemented using the elements of CyberCIEGE. The extensive features of CyberCIEGE 
allowed intelligence and attack logic to be built into the game, which enabled the 
development of this scenario to portray real-world PKI implementations and let the 
players recognize the implication of their own security decisions. 
The next chapter will cover the test objectives and strategies to verify the 
correctness of the Cert Attack scenario as well as provide a walkthrough on the proposed 
solution to the scenario. 
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V. SCENARIO TESTING 
This chapter describes the test methodology applied for the Cert Attack scenario. 
Details of the testing scope, expected results and actual results of each test case are also 
documented.  
A. TEST METHODOLOGY 
The main objective of this test is to demonstrate that the Cert Attack scenario can 
reasonably portray real-world PKI implementations, and that the simulation feedback to 
the player as he/she progresses in the game is consistent with real-world behavior to fully 
enhance the learning experience of the player. 
Test cases were designed to verify the flow of the scenario, such that the feedback 
provided in the simulation were logical and realistic as the player interacted with the 
game engine. The intention of this testing is not to be exhaustive and provide complete 
coverage for all edge test cases, but to ensure that the Cert Attack scenario continues to 
run as expected when new changes are introduced to the CyberCIEGE game engine in the 
future. 
Test procedures were developed by utilizing the game logging function, which 
logs each game event that occurred during the course of playing a scenario. After a 
scenario has been played, the resulting log can be replayed, such that the game 
automatically executes the click/key sequences necessary to get to a desired point within 
a scenario (CISR, 2011). In this way, test procedures can be repeatedly run against the 
game engine via these replay logs. 
Each test case corresponded to a game objective that was discussed in Chapter IV. 
The test cases were designed to be incremental, i.e., the test case for the next game 
objective depended upon the execution of the correct test sequence for the previous test 
case. The scenario was then executed according to the procedures defined in each test 
 
 
52 
case and the actual results were observed and recorded. Every test was executed on the 
same version of CyberCIEGE game engine to ensure consistency. 
For each test case, two categories of tests were considered. First, the scenario was 
tested with the desired game moves necessary to achieve the goal of the scenario. In this 
case, the player would receive positive feedback and advance to the next phase of the 
game. The second category of test cases involved anticipated alternative or incorrect 
game moves. In this case, the player made bad security decisions and configured the 
game components differently, hence deviating from the prescribed solution. The game 
would present negative feedback to either hint the player to reconfigure the components 
or to reinforce the players’ understanding on certain PKI concepts by allowing them to 
proceed only when they have answered the quiz correctly. 
B. TEST CASES 
This section presents four sets of test cases that were derived. The first part of the 
test case defines the scope of the test case as well as the procedures required to achieve 
the expected results, which forms the next part of the test case. The final part records the 
actual results observed from running the game against the test case. These results will be 
compared with the expected results to see if the test succeeds. 
1. Test Case 1: Authentication of Pete’s Certificate 
a. Scope of Test Case 
Test Case 1 corresponds to the first objective in Phase 1 of Cert Attack, 
which introduces the concept of self-signed certificates and cross-certification. At the 
start of the scenario, Shirley and Pete have been preconfigured to exchange e-mails using 
self-signed certificates, which will subject themselves to spoofed e-mail attacks by Roy. 
Therefore, the player has to perform the following procedures in the game: 
i)  Purchase a Certification Authority for Singa and place it in the 
server room at Singa’s office. 
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ii) Purchase a Certification Authority for Pura and place it in the 
server room at Pura’s office. 
iii) Right click on Pura’s CA and configure it to sign Singa’s CA. 
iv) Right click on Singa’s CA and configure it to sign Pura’s CA. 
v) Hire an additional IT support staff to manage the Singa’s CA and 
Pura’s CA. 
vi) Right click on Shirley’s workstation and configure her e-mail 
application settings: 
 Select “Singa’s CA” as her Certification Authority. 
 Add “Singa’s CA” to her list of installed roots. 
 Check “Authenticate Certificate” for “E-mail from Pete” under 
Incoming e-mail procedural settings. 
vii) Right click on Pete’s workstation and configure his e-mail 
application settings: 
 Select “Pura’s CA” as his Certification Authority. 
 Add “Pura’s CA” to his list of installed roots. 
 Check “Authenticate Certificate” for “E-mail from Shirley” 
under Incoming e-mail procedural settings. 
b. Expected Results 
If the player follows the procedures listed in the previous subsection, the 
scenario will proceed to the next part of Phase 1. If the player executes any incorrect 
move, he/she may not be able to achieve the objective, as summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Test Case 1 Expected results 
Test ID Description Expected Results 
1a The player executes the game sequence as 
described in Section B1a.  
(Note: The order by which steps iii-vii is to be 
performed does not matter.) 
Shirley and Pete will fulfill 
their objectives to exchange 
trusted e-mails. 
1b The player chooses the public Veriscream CA 
instead of purchasing CAs for Singa and 
Pura, selects it as Shirley’s and Pete’s 
Certification Authority and adds it to their list 
of installed roots. The player also checks the 
“Authenticate Certificate” option. 
Shirley and Pete will be able 
to exchange e-mails, but the 
e-mails will be spoofed by 
Roy. 
1c Instead of performing cross-certification via 
steps i-iv, the player chooses to add Singa’s 
CA to Pete’s list of installed roots and Pura’s 
CA to Shirley’s list of installed roots. 
Shirley and Pete will be able 
to exchange trusted e-mails 
and will not be susceptible to 
Roy’s attacks, but the player 
will fail the objective 
because this deviates from 
the company policies of 
Singa and Pura, as stated in 
the scenario briefing. 
 
c. Actual Results 
Table 3 documents the actual results and checks if they meet the expected 
results. 
Table 3.   Test Case 1 Actual results 
Test ID Actual Results Meets Expected Results? 
1a Shirley and Pete achieved their goals. Yes 
1b Shirley and Pete could exchange e-mails, but 
the e-mail’s integrity was compromised by 
Roy. As a result, the player incurred 
monetary penalties. 
Yes 
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Test ID Actual Results Meets Expected Results? 
1c Shirley and Pete could exchange trusted e-
mails, but the game did not proceed to the 
next objective and displayed a popup 
message informing the player to review the 
policy in the scenario briefing. 
Yes 
 
2. Test Case 2: Revocation of Sam’s Old Certificate 
a. Scope of Test Case 
Test Case 2 corresponds to the second objective in Phase 1 of Cert Attack, 
which introduces the notion of certificate revocation. A preconfigured trigger will 
simulate the exposure of Sam’s private key, which Roy will use to send spoofed e-mails 
to Pete. Therefore, the player has to perform the following procedures to resolve this 
issue: 
i)  Purchase a CRL server for Singa and place it in the server room at 
Singa’s office. This action will trigger the IT support staff to 
revoke Sam’s certificate. 
ii) Connect the CRL server to “Lan 1” (Singa’s network). 
iii) Right click on Sam’s workstation and configure his e-mail 
application settings: 
 Select “Singa’s CA” as his Certification Authority. 
 Add “Singa’s CA” to his list of installed roots. 
 Check “CRL” for “E-mail to Pete (Sam)” under Outgoing e-
mail procedural settings. 
iv) Right click on Pete’s workstation and configure his e-mail 
application settings: 
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 Check “Authenticate e-mail”, “Authenticate Certificate” and 
“CRL” for “E-mail from Sam” under Incoming e-mail 
procedural settings. 
b. Expected Results 
If the player follows the procedures listed in the previous subsection, the 
scenario will complete Phase 1 and proceed to Phase 2 of the game. If the player executes 
any incorrect move, he/she may not be able to complete Phase 1. Table 4 summarizes the 
details of the tests in Test Case 2. 
Table 4.   Test Case 2 Expected results 
Test ID Description Expected Results 
2a The player executes the game 
sequence as described in Section B2a.  
(Note: The order by which steps ii-v is 
to be performed does not matter.) 
Pete will fulfill his objective to 
receive trusted e-mails from Sam. 
2b The player configures Pete’s 
workstation to authenticate Sam’s e-
mail and certificate, but did not check 
the “CRL” option. 
Pete will receive spoofed e-mails 
from Roy. 
2c The player configures Sam’s and 
Pete’s workstations to check the 
“CRL” option, but does not purchase 
the CRL server, i.e., does not perform 
steps i-ii. 
Pete will not be able to receive e-
mails from Sam and fail his user 
goal, as he needs to be able to 
connect to a CRL server to check the 
certificate revocation status. 
 
c. Actual Results 
Table 5 documents the actual results and checks if they meet the expected 
results. 
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Table 5.   Test Case 2 Actual results 
Test ID Actual Results Meets Expected Results? 
2a Pete achieved his goal and the game 
proceeded to Phase 2. 
Yes 
2b Pete received spoofed e-mails from Roy. As a 
result, the player incurred monetary penalties. 
Yes 
2c Pete could not receive e-mails from Sam. The 
game did not proceed to the next phase and 
shifted the screen display to Pete to notify the 
player that the user was not achieving his 
goal. 
Yes 
 
3. Test Case 3: Receiving of Dave’s E-Mail 
a. Scope of Test Case 
Test Case 3 corresponds to the objective in Phase 2 of Cert Attack, which 
introduces the concept of certificate path processing. Dave will be tasked to send business 
specifications to Shirley, and the player has to perform the following procedures to 
enable Shirley to achieve this goal: 
i)  Right click on Shirley’s workstation and configure her e-mail 
application settings: 
 Check “Authenticate e-mail” and “Authenticate Certificate” for 
“E-mail from Dave” under Incoming e-mail procedural 
settings. 
ii) Right click on Pura’s CA and configure it to sign Friendly CA. 
iii) When the quiz is launched at the end of Phase 2, click on the 
correct answer “D–Sign Friendly’s CA (Dave’s CA) certificate 
with Pura’s CA, whose CA has been cross-certified with Singa’s 
CA, which is a trusted root installed in Shirley’s workstation.”. 
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b. Expected Results 
If the player follows the procedures listed in the previous subsection, the 
scenario will complete Phase 2 and proceed to Phase 3 of the game. If the player executes 
any incorrect move, he/she will need to attempt the quiz posted at the end of Phase 2 till 
he gets the correct answer before proceeding to Phase 3. Table 6 summarizes the details 
of the tests in Test Case 3. 
Table 6.   Test Case 3 Expected results 
Test ID Description Expected Results 
3a The player executes the game sequence as 
described in Section B3a.  
(Note: The order by which steps i-ii is to 
be performed does not matter.) 
Shirley will fulfill her 
objective to receive trusted e-
mails from Dave. 
3b Instead of certifying Friendly CA via step 
ii, the player chooses to add Friendly CA 
to Shirley’s list of installed roots and may 
choose to submit the quiz response “B–
Install Friendly CA’s (Dave’s CA) 
certificate as a trusted root in Shirley’s 
workstation.” 
Shirley will be able to receive 
trusted e-mails from Dave, but 
the player will fail the 
objective because this deviates 
from the Singa’s policy, as 
stated in the scenario briefing 
and may answer the quiz 
incorrectly. 
3c The player chooses to sign Friendly CA 
by configuring Singa’s CA instead of 
Pura’s CA and may choose to submit the 
quiz response “C–Sign Friendly CA’s 
(Dave’s CA) certificate with Singa’s CA, 
which is already a trusted root installed in 
Shirley’s workstation.” 
Shirley will be able to receive 
trusted e-mails from Dave, but 
the player may have 
misunderstood Singa’s policy, 
as stated in the scenario 
briefing and may answer the 
quiz incorrectly. 
c. Actual Results 
Table 7 documents the actual results and checks if they meet the expected 
results. 
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Table 7.   Test Case 3 Actual results 
Test ID Actual Results Meets Expected Results? 
3a Shirley achieved her goal. The player 
answered the quiz correctly and the game 
proceeded to Phase 3. 
Yes 
3b The player answered the quiz incorrectly 
and had to resubmit the response till the 
right answer was obtained. The game then 
proceeded to Phase 3. 
Yes 
3c The player answered the quiz incorrectly 
and had to resubmit the response till the 
right answer was obtained. The game then 
proceeded to Phase 3. 
Yes 
 
4. Test Case 4: Accessing of Rival’s Web Page 
a. Scope of Test Case 
Test Case 4 corresponds to the objective in final phase of Cert Attack, 
which aims to illustrate the subtle, yet important difference between the digital signing 
key and the identity key. Shirley will be instructed to place a purchase order via Rival’s 
webpage, which requires the player to set up TLS web client authentication by executing 
the following procedures: 
i)  Right click on Shirley’s workstation and configure her web 
browser application settings: 
 Select “Singa’s CA” as her Certification Authority. 
 When prompted to use existing certificate with Singa’s CA, 
click “No”. 
 In the popup dialog box, click on “Get Certificate & Key Pair” 
to generate a new “Identity” certificate and select it. 
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b. Expected Results 
If the player follows the procedures listed in the previous subsection, all 
the objectives of the game will be achieved and the player will win the game. If the 
player executes any incorrect move, he/she will observe an attack by Roy and will need 
to implement the appropriate countermeasure in order to complete the game. Table 8 
summarizes the details of the tests in Test Case 4. 
Table 8.   Test Case 4 Expected results 
Test ID Description Expected Results 
4a The player executes the game sequence as 
described in Section B4a.  
Shirley will fulfill her 
objective to place orders 
securely on Rival’s webpage. 
4b The player fails to configure Shirley’s 
workstation’s browser settings to enable the 
TLS web client session. 
Shirley will not be able to 
access Rival’s webpage and 
fail her user goal, as Rival’s 
web page requires TLS. 
4c The player chooses to use the existing e-mail 
certificate when he/she selects “Singa’s CA” 
as Shirley’s CA. 
Shirley will be able to access 
Rival’s webpage to place her 
orders, but Roy will be able 
craft a spoofed e-mail to Pete 
by exploiting the challenge 
signed unknowingly by 
Shirley during the TLS web 
client authentication process. 
c. Actual Results 
Table 9 documents the actual results and checks if they meet the expected 
results. 
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Table 9.   Test Case 4 Actual results 
Test ID Actual Results Meets Expected Results? 
4a Shirley achieved her goal and the player 
completed the Cert Attack scenario. 
Yes 
4b Shirley could not access Rival’s webpage. 
The game did not complete and the screen 
display was shifted to Shirley to notify the 
player that the user was not achieving her 
goal. 
Yes 
4c Roy was able to craft a spoofed e-mail to 
Pete by exploiting the challenge signed 
unknowingly by Shirley during the TLS web 
client authentication process and could use it 
to extort Singa. As a result, the player 
incurred monetary penalties. 
Yes 
 
C. SUMMARY 
The test methodology and test cases developed for the Cert Attack scenario 
verified that it achieved its intended educational goals. The testing also validated that the 
feedback provided by the CyberCIEGE game engine was consistent with real-world 
implementations. Test logs generated for each of the test cases described above could 
also serve as input to regression testing as changes are introduced to the CyberCIEGE 
game engine in the future.  
The next and final chapter concludes this thesis and proposes additional areas for 
future research. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. CONCLUSION 
This thesis focused on the current state of PKI implementations and 
understanding the pertinent variables that defined real-world PKI applications, which 
then led to the development of a CyberCIEGE scenario to depict the different 
configurations of PKI implementation and their corresponding security implications. By 
understanding the key concepts of PKI and subsequently researching on real-world 
implementation issues, suitable PKI functional elements were identified and modeled into 
the Cert Attack scenario. This new scenario is now an enhancement to the list of 
information security topic areas animated by CyberCIEGE. 
Computer security is constantly evolving and it is essential for security 
practitioners and educators to remain current and be equipped with the necessary training 
tools to edify users on complex security policies and technologies. CyberCIEGE’s 
interactive environment and extensible features allow Cert Attack to mimic real-world 
PKI issues and simulate feedback commensurate with real-world implementations. The 
lessons learnt from the development of this scenario can also be applied to the creation of 
new scenarios. 
B. ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are a few areas that could be explored for future development. These areas 
are related to PKI security and interoperability issues, which could either be built upon 
the Cert Attack scenario or could form the storyboard for new scenarios. A few candidate 
examples follow. 
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1. Presentation of Bogus Certificates 
In the Cert Attack scenario, when the player does not put in place the appropriate 
security measures to protect the e-mail assets, Roy will provide a description on how he 
was able to compromise the integrity of the e-mail. In particular, if the player allows the 
users to communicate using self-signed certificates, Roy will be able to create a “bogus 
certificate” to send spoofed e-mails. It would be useful to also present to the player a 
view of this “bogus certificate” to allow the player to compare how it differs from an 
actual certificate, and hence better appreciate the importance of making the correct 
security decision to protect the asset. 
To facilitate this, a “View Certificate” button could be built in a popup message 
box after Roy describes the attack. When the attack occurs, Roy’s bogus certificate would 
be automatically added into the certificate list in Shirley’s workstation, such that Shirley 
would be able to select the bogus certificate and click on “View Certificate” button in the 
“Validate Cert” dialog box. It would also be recommended to update the date and time 
during which the bogus certificate was issued (i.e., when the attack occurred in the 
game), so that the player would be able to distinguish a certificate that is signed by the 
actual user and one that has been spoofed by Roy.  
2. Modeling of CRL Semantics 
The current version of the game engine is programmed to prompt the IT support 
staff to revoke any certificate that has been exposed via the ExposeKey trigger. Though 
this is sufficient for the introduction of the basic concept of certificate revocation for the 
learning objective prescribed in this thesis, the CyberCIEGE game engine could be 
further enhanced to present details on how full-scale certificate revocation mechanisms 
are implemented. 
Future work could; for example, look into how the actual CRL structure 
(presented in Chapter II, Figure 4) can be modeled in CyberCIEGE to allow players to 
see/review the list of revoked certificates. The game engine can also be modified to 
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update the status of the X.509 certificate interface to let the players observe the difference 
between normal certificates and revoked certificates. 
Currently, the Cert Attack scenario is designed based on the assumption that all 
transactions are conducted online and that certificate revocation status are polled via a 
CRL distribution point. It would be useful to consider the case when the CRL distribution 
point is unreachable and the users may have to fall back to offline operations for some 
operational contingency. New CyberCIEGE scenarios could be developed to illustrate a 
different mode of online operation, i.e., the use of OCSP to provide more real-time and 
up-to-date certificate revocation and a representation on how organizations handle the 
contingent case when the OCSP service becomes unavailable. Coupled with the modeling 
of how e-mail clients or web browsers handle CRL checking, this would allow players to 
garner more in-depth PKI knowledge surrounding the important support infrastructure 
issue of certificate revocation. 
3. Web Client Authentication Educational Video 
The final phase of the current Cert Attack scenario scales the requirement from e-
mail communications to also include Web access. Currently, Roy will provide a verbal 
description on how he exploits the misconfigured Web client authentication settings. It 
would be beneficial if the player could see a video sequence of the Web client 
authentication procedures and how the individual steps could be exploited using a myriad 
of attacks (e.g., replay, man-in-the-middle, etc.). 
4. Testing with Students 
The test cases presented in Chapter V were derived based on anticipated player 
actions. It would be more fruitful to involve the intended audience in the testing phase to 
verify that the game does provide the necessary feedback to facilitate autonomous game  
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play, and that the players actually do comprehend and learn the targeted PKI learning 
objectives. This scenario could be provided to NPS students in the Information 
Operations & Assurance track, whose game/scenario play could provide valuable 
feedback to further improve the scenario. 
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